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In Ontology Made Easy, Amie Thomasson defends two striking deﬂationary theses. The
ﬁrst is epistemological: there are easy ways of knowing whether numbers, properties, and
other such hotly disputed entities exist. The second is metaontological: there is something
wrong with prolonged debates about the existence of such objects. I am interested in the
relationship between the two. As we will see, the epistemological thesis does not by itself
entail the metaontological thesis. Rather, the case for deﬂationary metaontology rests lar-
gely on a controversial doctrine about the possible meanings of ‘object’.
There is much of value in the book that I won’t have space to explore. Thomasson
makes a strong case that her easy approach to ontology makes her the true heir of Car-
nap, that this approach has been wrongly neglected in favor of quantiﬁer variantism, and
that it can be defended against a wide range of objections. Ontology Made Easy is cut-
ting edge work in metaontology and should be required reading for anyone interested in
deﬂationary approaches in metaphysics.
1. Epistemology and Metaontology
One accepts an easy approach to existence questions if one accepts (i) that “all well-
formed existence questions may be answered by conceptual and/or empirical work” and
(ii) that “at least some disputed existence questions may be answered by means of trivial
inferences from uncontroversial premises” (128).1 I will be focusing exclusively on (ii),
the claim that there are a range of existence questions that are especially easy to answer.
For Thomasson, these include (but are not limited to) questions about the existence of
numbers, tables, properties, propositions, and marriages, all of which she takes to be
easily answerable in the afﬁrmative.
When Thomasson says that existence questions are easily answerable, I take her to be
endorsing the following thesis about what we can know:
(EA) One can come to know the answers to certain disputed existence questions on
the basis of trivial inferences from uncontroversial premises.2
1 Unless otherwise noted, all references are to Thomasson (2015).
2 See, e.g., pp. 148 and 203. She sometimes makes only the weaker claim that one is entitled to accept the
answers on the basis of such inferences; see, e.g., pp. 142-143 and 232-235.
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For instance, one can come to know that there are numbers by inferring it from the
uncontroversial premise that there are nine Supreme Court justices:
(A1) There are nine Supreme Court justices.
(A2) If there are nine Supreme Court justices, then there are numbers (e.g., the
number of justices).
(A3) So, there are numbers.
The linking premise in the reasoning—A2—is not itself uncontroversial. But (the idea
goes) it is true, and, moreover, one can know that it is true without engaging in any hard
philosophical work: anyone who understands the term ‘number’ is already thereby in a
position to see straightaway that A2 is true. Thus, those who are willing to infer A3 from
A1—because they are either ignorant of, or else undeterred by, the philosophical chal-
lenges to A2—can thereby secure knowledge of A3 in this easy way.
The other key component of Thomasson’s overall deﬂationary view is the following
deﬂationary metaontological thesis:
(DM) Philosophical debates about existence questions are pointless.
Or, as she other times puts it, there is something “wrong” or “amiss” with the debates.3
At times, Thomasson seems to suggest that DM follows immediately from the EA. For
instance:
“although on this view the disputed existence questions are meaningful and answerable
(generally in the positive), they turn out to be answerable so trivially that the ‘hard’
debates about these issues that have so exercised metaphysicians in recent decades seem
misguided and pointless” (158-159; cf. 22, 128, and 167).
But, as I hope to show, this move from straightforward answerability to DM is far too
quick.
2. Defeating Easy Knowledge
Things that are straightforwardly known can sometimes face legitimate challenges. Kate
was at the conference last week, and Julie clearly remembers seeing her there. Julie
thereby knows, in a straightforward way, that Kate was at the conference. If I then chal-
lenge her belief that Kate was at the conference with compelling (albeit misleading) evi-
dence, then Julie’s belief is defeated: she cannot rationally go on believing that Kate was
at the conference unless she can somehow assure herself that my evidence is misleading.
A debate about whether Kate was there—centered on the status of the evidence to the
contrary—would not be pointless. The point would be to address the putative defeaters.
The same goes for easily answerable philosophical questions. As an illustration, take
the free will debate. Compatibilists of a certain stripe will say that if S chose to / with-
out being coerced or manipulated into /ing, then S freely chose to /. Suppose they’re
right about this. In that case, questions of freedom are easily answerable in the relevant
3 See pp. 158-160.
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sense. Lenny, who is unaware of the arguments for incompatibilism, can know that some
of his choices are free simply by means of a trivial inference from the uncontroversial
premise that some of his choices weren’t coerced or manipulated:
(B1) I chose to order dessert without being coerced or manipulated.
(B2) If so, then I freely chose to order dessert.
(B3) So, I freely chose to order dessert.
B2 of course is not uncontroversial, but then neither is A2. What makes this a trivial
inference is that one doesn’t need any philosophical sophistication in order to know that
B2 is true; it seems to be exactly on a par with A2.
Still, the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists is perfectly sensible. Why?
Because the incompatibilist’s arguments give us serious (albeit, we are supposing, mislead-
ing) reason to think that even choices that are not coerced or manipulated are unfree; more
is required for freedom. Yes, B3 is easily known if true, but that doesn’t mean its truth—
and a fortiori its knowability—can’t legitimately be called into question. Any entitlement
we have to believe that our choices are free on the basis of such trivial inferences is surely
going to be defeasible, and the status of putative defeaters can legitimately be debated.
Thomasson will presumably agree that questions about free choice can legitimately be
debated despite being easily answerable. But she will likely insist that there is a crucial dis-
analogy between these questions and the indicated existence questions. In the former but
not the latter, she will say, there is a sensible debate to be had about the application condi-
tions of the relevant terms. The free will incompatibilist is able to provide a sensible account
of what more is required for the term ‘free’ to apply to a choice, for instance that the choice
not be determined by any factors outside one’s control. Can eliminativists about numbers—
or, for that matter, realists in search of a question worthy of debate—likewise offer a sensi-
ble alternative to A2 to serve as application conditions for ‘number’?
Thomasson thinks that the best eliminativists can do is to insist that A2 be replaced
with something like A2*:
(A2*) If there are nine Supreme Court justices, and there is an object that numbers
the justices, then there are numbers.
In slogan form, they can “objectify” the application conditions, by explicitly requiring
the existence of some relevant object.4 Thomasson maintains, however, that there cannot
be any sensible debate between realists and eliminativists about whether such objectiﬁed
application conditions are satisﬁed. And if she’s right about that, then it would seem that
DM is true: there really is nothing sensible for realists and eliminativists to be debating.
3. The Meanings of ‘Object’
Why think there can’t be sensible debate about objectiﬁed application conditions like
A2*? Thomasson argues that friends of the objectiﬁed application conditions face a
dilemma (108-111). There are two ways of understanding ‘object’, she says, neither of
which will serve the eliminativist’s purposes. First, there is the sortal use, whose applica-
tion conditions are roughly as follows: there is an S-object (‘S’ for sortal) in some
4 See, e.g., pp. 108-109, 195, and 292.
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situation if there is a medium-sized region of space in that situation whose contents are
well bonded together and are independently mobile from surrounding stuff.5 In short, S-
objects are medium-sized dry goods, or “Spelke objects”. Second, there is the covering
use, whose application conditions are roughly as follows: there is a C-object (‘C’ for cov-
ering) in some situation if we have some sortal concept whose application conditions are
satisﬁed in that situation.
Here is the rub. If ‘object’ is read as S-object, then A2* can’t be a sensible target for
debate since all sides agree that numbers aren’t medium-sized dry goods. If ‘object’ is
read as C-object, then A2* is no more demanding than A2, since the application condi-
tions for one of our sortal terms, ‘number’, are satisﬁed so long as there are nine jus-
tices.6 And since these are the only intelligible ways of understanding ‘object’ in A2*,
the idea goes, there is no way of understanding the proposed objectiﬁed application con-
ditions that can deliver a sensible subject of debate.
The argument from the possible uses of ‘object’ to metaontological deﬂationism about
debates over the existence of numbers can then be framed as follows:
(C1) There is something wrong with philosophical debates about the existence
of numbers unless there are objectiﬁed application conditions
for ‘number’ that are (i) well formed and (ii) such that disputants disagree
about whether they are satisﬁed.
(C2) If ‘object’ means S-object or C-object in objectiﬁed application conditions
for ‘number’, then disputants do not disagree about whether they are satisﬁed.
(C3) If ‘object’ does not mean S-object or C-object in objectiﬁed application
conditions for ‘number’, then the objectiﬁed application conditions
are ill formed.
(C4) So, there is something wrong with philosophical debates about the existence
of numbers.
Before I turn to assessing the argument, it is worth noting just how much work is being
done in the book by Thomasson’s contention that there are only these two readings of
‘object’. It plays a key role in:
(i) her argument that Carnap is not a quantiﬁer variantist (73 n.29),
(ii) her argument that ﬁctionalists cannot explain what it takes for a sentence like
A3 to be literally true (195-197),
(iii) her defense of arbitrary mereological fusions and a plenitudinous ontology of
material objects (214, 221),7
5 Cf. her (2009: 458).
6 One might worry that questions are being begged here, insofar as Thomasson is assuming that the appli-
cation conditions for ‘number’ are non-objectiﬁed. I won’t pursue this worry here.
7 The S-object/C-object dilemma doesn’t explicitly come up here, but it must be playing a role in the back-
ground. Thomasson says that her view delivers extraordinary material objects like gollyswoggles and
trout-turkeys. Why is that? The idea, I take it, is that ‘trout-turkey’ was introduced with the following
application conditions: there is a trout-turkey if there is a front half of a trout, a back half of a turkey,
and an object composed of the two. But (the idea goes) there trivially will be such a C-object and it’s
irrelevant that it isn’t an S-object.
BOOK SYMPOSIUM 239
(iv) her response to the objection that her simple realism requires that there “magi-
cally” be enough objects to render all the disputed existence claims true (218-
220), and
(v) her argument that there is no way to make sense of an alleged “heavyweight”
reading of the quantiﬁers in A3 (292-293).
So there is quite a bit riding on her claim that ‘object’ must mean either S-object or C-
object.8
I deny C3. There is a further sense of ‘object’—call it U-object, for ‘unrestricted’—
which we both can and do understand, one that applies unrestrictedly to everything, to
all things, to whatever is in the largest domain, that applies to something no matter what
it is.9 Thomasson will surely object that the dilemma arises anew for every one of these
characterizations: ‘thing’—in ‘all things’, ‘something’, ‘the largest domain [of things]’—
likewise has only a sortal and covering reading.10 Which of course I will deny, insisting
that there is a well-understood, unrestricted reading of ‘thing’ as well. Which leaves us at
something of an impasse.
In what follows, I try to move the debate forward by challenging what I see as
Thomasson’s main argument in defense of C3 (§4) and by offering some reasons of my
own for rejecting C3 (§5).
4. The Case Against the Unrestricted Reading of ‘Object’
When Thomasson does explicitly entertain the possibility that ‘object’ is being used to
mean something other than S-object or C-object, her complaint is that it must in those
cases lack application conditions (219, 292-293). Importantly, for Thomasson, in order
for a term to count as having application conditions, in the intended sense, there must be
something like rules that speakers with no antecedent understanding of the term can fol-
low to determine whether the term applies in a given situation (89-90). In short, applica-
tion conditions must be nontrivial; “‘U-object’ applies iff there is a U-object” won’t cut
it.
The argument for C3 can then be stated as follows.
(D1) If ‘object’ is not being used to mean S-object or C-object, then it is being
used without nontrivial application conditions.
(D2) If ‘object’ is being used without nontrivial application conditions, then claims
in which it appears are ill formed.
(C3) So, if ‘object’ is not being used to mean S-object or C-object in objectiﬁed
application conditions for ‘number’, then the objectiﬁed application
conditions are ill formed.
8 As Schaffer observes (2009: 152), it also bears much of the argumentative weight in her (2007).
9 I say that it is a “further” sense, but actually I doubt that ‘object’ ever means C-object or S-object. My
own view is that it only ever means U-object or material continuant. But I won’t have the space to
defend that view here.
10 And see her (2009: §6) against characterizing the additional reading of ‘object’ using quantiﬁers and the
identity predicate.
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Let’s just grant D1, that ‘object’ lacks nontrivial application conditions when we try to
use it to mean U-object.11 Why accept D2? Some meaningful and intelligible expressions
very plausibly have no nontrivial application conditions, for instance logical expressions
like ‘and’, ‘or’, and ‘if’. So why think ‘object’ (or ‘thing’ or ‘something’) is meaningful
only if it is used with nontrivial application conditions?
Here is what Thomasson has to say on the matter: “if a term lacks application conditions,
we cannot (in the object language) evaluate claims about whether or not the corresponding
entities exist” (219). But what does it mean to say that such a claim is unevaluable? Perhaps
the idea is that ‘numbers exist’ would be semantically unevaluable (i.e., incapable of having
a truth value) because the application conditions for ‘number’ given in A2*—that there be
an object that numbers the justices—are ill formed. But then what we have is just a reitera-
tion of D2, not an argument for it. Alternatively, perhaps the idea is that ‘numbers exist’
would then be epistemically unevaluable, since, without nontrivial application conditions
for ‘object’ to work with, we cannot understand A2* well enough to assess whether the
antecedent is satisﬁed. But this seems just to beg the question against the envisaged friends
of U-objects, who challenge D2 on the grounds that ‘object’ is among the expressions that
are meaningful and intelligible despite lacking nontrivial application conditions.
So, absent further argument, I am inclined to reject D2 and C3, thus clearing the way
for denying DM.12
5. In Defense of Another Sense
I’ve argued that Thomasson fails to establish C3. But is there any good reason to deny
it? Is there reason to think that there is another available reading of ‘object’—one that
applies to everything, even if it isn’t a medium-sized dry good, even if it doesn’t fall
under any of our sortal concepts? To be honest, it just seems obvious to me that there is
such a reading. When Thomasson tells us that there is no intelligible notion there, and
that U-object is just some philosopher’s failed invention, I am reminded of Kripke’s reac-
tion to Quine’s anti-essentialism. Quine claimed that essential properties are made up by
some confused philosopher and that there is no sense to be made of the claim that Nixon
himself (however you what to describe him) has the property of possibly losing the elec-
tion. To which Kripke replied: “now which one is being the philosopher here?”13
Of course, what’s obvious to me won’t be obvious to everyone. So, in hopes of moving
the debate forward, let me give two arguments that ‘object’ sometimes means U-object.14
Here is the ﬁrst argument, which is meant to show that, given her other commitments,
Thomasson herself ought to recognize a further sense of ‘object’. Consider the following
sentence:
(H) There are abstract objects for which no one has a sortal concept.15
11 Though see Schaffer (2009: 150-151) for some candidate application conditions.
12 One can perhaps extrapolate an additional argument for D2 from Thomasson’s discussion of the qua
problem (95). See my (2015: §4.4.2) for discussion of an argument from the qua problem as it arises in
her (2007).
13 Kripke (1980: 41).
14 See also Evnine (forthcoming: 160 n.17) for the makings of an argument that something like U-object
may be playing an implicit role in Thomasson’s own thinking about “co-application conditions”.
15
‘H’ for Hamlet: “there are more things in heaven and earth . . . than are dreamt of in your philosophy.”
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Thomasson herself will presumably want to afﬁrm (H). She defends a simple realism
according to which numbers, propositions, and other such entities are mind-independent
existents that long pre-dated us (chapter 3.3). And presumably she’d agree that there is
more out there to be discovered, that we have yet to name or conceptualize. Indeed, (H)
should strike her as trivially true, since by her own lights all we have to do is cook up
some new sortal term and application conditions (meeting fairly undemanding con-
straints),16 and we can be conﬁdent that there are entities answering to the term. And
since, by the lights of her simple realism, the cooking doesn’t itself bring these entities
into existence, they must already be out there.
Yet reading ‘object’ as S-object turns (H) into the absurd claim that there are abstract
medium-sized dry goods; and reading it as C-object turns (H) into a trivial falsehood,
true iff abstracta belonging to sortal concepts we have don’t belong to sortal concepts we
have. To ﬁnd a true reading of (H), Thomasson must allow that there is some other read-
ing of ‘object’. Perhaps U-object.
Here is a second argument. There has been some debate over whether ‘the Supreme
Court’ is referentially singular or referentially plural.17 Does it refer plurally just to the
nine justices, or does it refer singularly to a single object composed of the justices? In
other words, is the following sentence true?
(S) The Supreme Court is one object.
This is a sensible question with no obvious answer. But the question cannot be whether
the Supreme Court is an S-object, since it plainly isn’t: whatever it is, it’s not a medium-
sized dry good whose parts are “well bonded”. Nor can the question be whether the
Supreme Court is a C-object. Sentences of the form o is one C-object come out true so
long as, for some kind K for which we have a sortal concept, o is one K comes out true.
And, since trivially the Supreme Court is a supreme court, it follows that the Supreme
Court is one C-object.18 So there is no way to make sense of the sensible debate over
(S) unless we recognize some other sense of ‘object’. Perhaps U-object.
One may object that this argument is question-begging: Thomasson has already denied
that there can be sensible debates about existence questions, so why should she grant that
there can be sensible debate about (S)? Notice, though, that (S) is something even a fairly
permissive ontologist can puzzle over. Even supposing that there is some object com-
posed of the justices, there is still the question of whether ‘the Supreme Court’ picks out
that object or rather refers plurally to the justices themselves. Accordingly, the debate
over (S) needn’t be an “existence debate”: even those who are completely in agreement
about what there is can disagree about what the Supreme Court is. It is therefore entirely
16 See her chapter 8.2 for discussion of the constraints on successfully introducing new referring expres-
sions.
17 See, e.g., Uzquiano (2004), Lopez de Sa (2007), Ritchie (2013: §2), and Korman (2015: §8.3.2).
18 Can I agree that the Supreme Court is a supreme court without thereby conceding that the Supreme Court
is a (one) U-object? Yes. Cf. McKay (2006: 42) on ‘a dozen’: “There is no single thing that is a dozen
bagels, there are twelve things that are a dozen bagels. . . The phrase ‘a dozen’ is only misleadingly
singular.”
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open to proponents of DM to accept that this is a sensible dispute. No questions are
begged.
6. Conclusion
I have been criticizing Thomasson’s defense of her deﬂationary metaontological thesis,
which as we saw ultimately rests on the claim that there is no sense to be made of the
metaphysician’s unrestricted use of ‘object’. In doing so, I hope to have cleared the way
for my preferred view of these matters. EA is true: absent defeaters, the trivial inferences
are indeed a route to knowing the very things that realists afﬁrm and eliminativists deny.
But DM is false: prolonged debates about existence questions do have a point. The point
is to assess strategies for reinstating or circumventing easy routes to knowledge once
putative defeaters (in the form of arguments for eliminativism) have rendered them
suspect.19
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